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Statistics - Ky Court Rpt

Workers Compensation

Unexplained fall and presumption of work relatedness in workers compensation cases: AK STEEL V. ADKINS (SC 5/22/2008)

AK STEEL v. ADKINS
WORKERS COMP:
Unexplained fall and presumption of work relatedness
2007-SC-000515-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
FROM COA
DATE RENDERED: 5/22/2008

The Claimant fell while attempting to close the door of a coal hopper, hitting her head and injuring her shoulder. She testified that she assumed it was because she lost her footing but could not remember. The Administrative Law Judge referred to cases which establish a presumption of work relatedness if the employee is unable because of the injury to remember how the accident happened, however, KRS 342.720 is the statute which contains the precise situations where the presumption applies. While the case contains a good discussion of the presumption, the Supreme Court considered the circumstantial evidence of work-relatedness as a permissible inference and affirmed on substantial evidence grounds.

Peter Naake, Editor

Triple multiplier applied if unable to perform any of the jobs at time of injury: MILLER V. SQUARE D (SC 4/24/2008)

MILLER V. SQUARE D CO.
WORKERS COMP:  Triple Multiplier
2007-SC-000361-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
DATE RENDERED: 4/24/2008 -  79

Workers Compensation - Triple Multiplier - The claimant worked as a mold technician and also at an assembly job for Square D. He was injured performing the mold technician job, but was able to perform that work after recuperating from his injury. He testified that he was unable to perform the assembly job. The Administrative Law Judge found that he was not entitled to an enhanced benefit for being unable to return to work at the job he was doing at the time of the injury, under Lowes #0507 v. Greathouse 182 SW3d 584, (2006), a case which involved two different employers. The Court reversed and remanded the case to the ALJ for a finding as to whether the claimant could perform all of the jobs which he was doing for the employer at the time of the injury, including the assembly job, holding that the Lowes #0507 was inapplicable to these facts.

Digested by Peter Naake

Employer not allowed credit against disability award for wages paid beyond two-year period of eligibility: MILLERSBURG MILITARY INSTITUTE V. PUCKETT (SC 4/24/2008)

MILLERSBURG MILITARY INSTITUTE V. PUCKETT
WORKERS COMP:  Credit for Payments Made by Employer
2007-SC-000549-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
OPINION OF THE COURT; ABRAMSON NOT SITTING
DATE RENDERED: 4/24/2008 -77

The Employee was over 65 years old when he was injured, thus his benefit period was limited to two years. He was awarded disability benefits, and the employer was given credit for periods of temporary total disability paid during recuperation, and also for wages paid for two hours of work per day thereafter. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the wages paid were bona fide wages and not payments for disability, therefore, no credit is allowed per KRS 342.730. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal.

By Peter Naake

Exception for reopening claim applied retroactively: OFFICEWARE V. JACKSON (SC 3/20/2008)

OFFICEWARE V. JACKSON
WORKERS COMP:  Time period for reopening claim
2007-SC-000303-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
OPINION OF THE COURT
DATE RENDERED: 3/20/2008

SC affirmed ALJ's holding that reopening claim was not time barred finding that the statutory amendment adding an exception to the four-year limitations period for reopening a workers' compensation claim after original award existed for a claim seeking temporary total disability benefits during period of original award was is a remedial provision involving a change to the procedural requirements for reopening, and thus, the exception applies retroactively to original claims that arose and were decided before the amendment's July 14, 2000 effective date.  Furthermore, the employer's denial of claimant's request to reopen was unreasonable, and thus, claimant was entitled to interest on past-due benefits at statutory rate of 18 percent and to award of attorney fees.


Payable PIP deducted from UIM recover even when it looks like it never will be payable and no Minton reduction given for WC offset against UIM: KENTUCKY SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION V. JEWELL (COA 3/7/2008)

KENTUCKY SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION V. JEWELL
INSURANCE:  PIP, WORKERS COMPENSATION AND SUBROGATION
2006-CA-001995
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
PANEL: HENRY PRESIDING; COMBS, ACREE CONCUR
COUNTY: WHITLEY
DATE RENDERED: 3/7/2008

This case has an unsual procedural history since the first decision was not published, then following a request for reconsideration by the COA, the request was granted and a revised opinion published!  A motion for discretion review was filed on 4/7/2008 with the Supreme Court.

This case involved a claimant injured in the scope of employment who settled her disputed workers compensation claim for $25,000 and was assigned the subrogation rights in exchange for her future medicals.  She then settled for the $25,000 policy limits of the liability carrier and pursued a claim for underinsured motorist benefits (UIM).  A verdict was received in excess of the liability limits, but a post-verdict dispute arose on the applicability of the offsets for workers compensation and "payable" PIP as it applied to the UIM benefits.

Jewell had received $17,734.55 in workers compensation benefits, and her health insurer had also paid some of her medical bills as there was a dispute over a pre-existing condition such that $8,307.45 of her workers compensation settlement went to pay her health insurer for medical bills (which had not been paid by PIP).  Workers comp carrier assigned Jewell its third party subrogation rights.

With regard to her personal injury claim, she settled with tortfeasor for policy limits of $25,000.  PIP had paid $333.45 in benefits for lost wages not covered by workers compensation and then proceeded directly against KSBA for underinsured motorist benefits.

The jury awarded a total of $101,102.77 which included $70,558.77 for medical expenses, $5,544.00 for lost wages, and $25,000 for pain and suffering.  The trial court applied a $25,000 offset from the liability settlement with the tortfeasor and the $333.45 paid by PIP.

The UIM carrier sought an additional offset for the $26,826.55 in past medical bills and wages and the remainder of the "payable" PIP of $19,666.55 (the policy provided for $20,000 in basic PIP rather than the standard and usual $10,000).  The UIM carrier's position was that failure to award an offset would result in a double recovery per Cinn. Ins. Co. v. Samples.

The COA agreed with the UIM carrier and held a payment made in performance of a contractual obligation [by a UIM carrier ] is not a payment of “damages.”  Therefore, the rights which Jewell gained in her settlement agreement do not include subrogation rights against the KSBA (UIM), since the workers ’ compensation carrier had no subrogation rights against the UIM carrier. A workers ’ compensation carrier cannot assign a subrogation right that it itself does not possess.

COA also rejected the argument that the claimant was entitled to an offset per AIK v. Minton such that Jewell's attorneys' fees and expenses of $30,307.72 plus legal expenses of $4,781.73 should be deducted from the offset claimed.  The COA concluded the last sentence in KRS 342.700(1) was a limit on the subrogation right and recovery from the responsible third party - Minton did not apply here.

With regard to the PIP offset for the full $20,000 that was "payable", the COA held that due to the presence of the word “payable ” in the statute, Kentucky courts have concluded that the full amount of BRB payable may be offset against a claimant ’s damages, whether or not a claimant actually received the BRB.

The COA then affirmed the $25,000 deduction from the liability limits, and upon remand the lower court shall deduct from the jury verdict workers compensation benefits of $26,042 for past medical expenses and $784.55 for lost wages, and $20,000 for payable basic reparation benefits.

Comments:  This decision has holes in it.  First, the workers compensation settlement included payment of medical bills paid by health insurance rather with those amounts billed versus paid were not reflected in this decision (not to mention the value of that subrogation payment may have been compromised as part of the settlement of the workers compensation claim).  Second, the workers compensation subrogation amount was not reduced to reflect Minton as it applied to the underlying $25,000 liability settlement and any pro rata division of that recovery as it applied to the claimant and the workers compensation subrogor (even though this right of subrogation was assigned it still needed to be reflected in that portion of the recovery against the tortfeasor).  Third, no mention was made in the decision regarding the MRVA provision that workers compensation is primary and thus PIP would not be "payble" at all per statute.  Fourth, is PIP still "payable" even after the statute of limitations for a claim has expired?  Fifth, the "payable" portion of PIP and the applicable case law refers to "basic reparation benefits" and not just reparation benefits such that applying the $20,000 of "basic" reparation benefits in the insurance policy is questionable.

This case has unanswered questions and needs to be reviewed by the Supreme Court to answer these questions.

Although all are in agreement that the law provides for no duplicate payments, there is an obvious disagreement and potential hardship in calculating the amount of that payment in light of subrogation, assignment, disputed claims, and PIP that will never  be payable per SOL and WC. It is one thing to assert that a claimant should not be paid twice; but it is an entirely another matter to take money away from the claimant and allow the contractual UIM carrier to reap the benefit of a phantom PIP payment and no reduction of the subrogation claim's value per Minton.  "Payable" within the context of workers compensation, statute of limitations, and the actual circumstances needs to be cleared up.

Digested by Michael Stevens

WORKERS COMP: Company owner is company officer and afforded workers compensation coverage unless rejected: KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE V. J & R MINING, INC. (COA 3/7/2008)

KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE V. J & R MINING, INC.
WORKERS COMP:  Coverage of owner
2007-CA-001901
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: DIXON PRESIDING; CLAYTON, GRAVES CONCUR
COUNTY:  WORKERS COMP BOARD
DATE RENDERED: 3/7/2008

Earl Reed, an owner with his wife of J& R Mining, Inc., was killed while working for his company. The insurer, KEMI, contested coverage on the basis that he was an owner and had not elected to be covered by the policy. The Court held that, as an officer of the corporation, he was an employee of the corporation, requiring rejection of coverage filed in Frankfort on a particular form. Since this was not done, and the signature on an exclusion form provided by the insurer was questioned, the Court held that the decedent was covered by workers’ compensation.

Peter Naake, editor

Teacher's injury at convention with students arose out of employment for workers comp claim: CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF ED. V. JACOBS (COA 2/22/2008)

CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF ED. V. JACOBS
WORKERS COMP:  Arising out of employment
2007-CA-001575
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL:  THOMPSON PRESIDING; NICKELL, VANMETER CONCUR
COUNTY: WCB
DATE RENDERED: 2/22/2008

The Court affirmed an award of disability benefits to a teacher who fell while attending a beta-club convention with her students out of town. The Court held that the activity benefited the employer, and therefore arose out of employment even though it occurred away from the employer’s premises.

Peter Naake

Widow’s survivor benefits terminate at the time she reaches the age of sixty (60), when she will qualify for widows’ benefits under the Social Security Act: MORSEY, INC. V. FRAZIER (SC 2/21/2008)

MORSEY, INC. V. FRAZIER
WORKERS COMP:  Survivor Benefits
2007-SC-000159-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: REVERSING AND REMANDING
OPINION OF THE COURT
DATE RENDERED: 2/21/2008

KRS 342 .730(4) limits the duration of an award of survivors’ benefits to a widow of an employee who dies because of a work related accident to the date when the widow would qualify for regular Social Security retirement benefits based on the employee’s earnings record. Referring to 42 U.S .C. § 402(e), the Court held that a widow’s benefits terminate at the time she reaches the age of sixty (60), when she will qualify for widows’ benefits under the Social Security Act.

Digest by Peter Naake

TTD benefits issue was properly preserved and final and appealable by claimant: UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. V. PETERSON (COA 2/15/2008)

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. V. PETERSON
WORKERS COMP:  TTD benefits issue was properly preserved and final and appealable
2007-CA-001479
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL:  THOMPSON, PRESIDING;  NICKELL, VANMETER CONCUR
COUNTY: WCB
DATE RENDERED: 2/15/2008

The employer, United Parcel Service, Inc., petitions for review of an opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the Chief Administrative Law Judge's (CALJ) finding that Martina Stoudmire properly preserved as an issue whether she was entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits (TTD benefits). The Board further found, however, that the CALJ failed to address whether substantial evidence existed that, because of Stoudemire's left knee and low back conditions, she had not reached a level of improvement that would permit her to return to her customary employment. KRS 342.0011(11)(a). As a result, the Board remanded the case for additional findings.

The sole issue raised on this appeal is whether the Board correctly concluded that Stoudmire had properly preserved the issue of additional TTD benefits from July 16, 2004, through August 1, 2005. UPS contends that pursuant to 803 KAR 25:010 § 13, Stoudemire did not preserve the issue by raising it at the hearing or designating it as a contested issue. The regulation provides that the CALJ is to conduct a benefit review conference and, if the claim is not settled as a result of the conference, a summary stipulation of all contested and uncontested issues must be prepared and signed by the parties and the CALJ. The regulation further provides that only contested issues shall be the subject of further proceedings.

Although the issue of additional TTD benefits was not raised at the initial benefit review conference, the extent and duration of disability was specifically designated as a contested issue in the parties' stipulations. UPS's preservation argument ignores that the term “disability” as used in KRS 342.730, encompasses both temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has recently rejected the argument now poised by UPS.

COA held the WCB's decision was final and appealable, and the claimant properly preserved issue whether she was entitled to additional TTD benefits.

Michael Stevens

Workers Comp - No offset for certain employer funded disability pension payments per KRS 342.730(6): ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP. V. STONE (COA 2/8/2008)

ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP. V. STONE
WORKERS COMP:  No offset for certain employer funded disability pension payments per KRS 342.730(6)
2007-CA-001677
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: VANMETER PRESIDING JUDGE; NICKELL AND THOMPSON CONCUR
COUNTY: WCB
DATE RENDERED: 2/08/2008

Stone was totally occupationally disabled due to a cervical injury sustained while working for Alcan. At that time, Alcan had three retirement plan options: normal, early and full disability. Under the normal retirement plan, at age 65, an employee could retire and receive a defined benefit calculated by a dollar amount times years of service. Under the early retirement plan, an employee who had reached the age of 60 could retire and receive a discounted amount. The full disability retirement plan available to an employee who met certain medical criteria, was calculated similarly to the normal retirement benefit, without the discount for early retirement. In this case, Stone opted to receive $990.54 per month in disability retirement benefits, which is 15% more than he would have received under early retirement.

Under KRS 342.730(6)(Determination of income benefits for disability -- Survivors' rights -- Termination -- Offsets -- Notification of return to work), an offset is allowed against workers' compensation benefits for income benefits paid from certain employer-funded disability or accident and sickness plans. When Jackie Stone ceased working for Alcan Aluminum due to a total, permanent disability, he elected to receive benefits under Alcan's disability retirement benefits plan. The issue is whether the benefits paid to Stone under the plan met the requirements of KRS 342.730(6). COA affirmed the Workers' Compensation Board's opinion which held Alcan should receive an offset only for the amount that Stone's disability pension exceeds the pension to which he would have been entitled under Alcan's early retirement.

Michael Stevens