Kentucky Court Report - SCOKY & COAKY

Attorney Fees; Withdrawing representation on contingency fee arrangement, lawyer still entitled to quantum merit recovery: Bradley v. Est. of Herman Lester, COA, Pub., 11/11/2011

Termination of representation on a contingent fee contract places payment for  your services from the recovery in jeopardy.  In the following COA decision, withdrawing cost the attorney his contractual contingent fee but permitting the attorney a quantum merit recovery for his services.

 1045.  ATTORNEY FEES.  CONTRACT VS. QUANTUM MERUIT UPON VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWING.
BRADLEY (SAM), ET AL.
VS.
ESTATE OF HERMAN LESTER
OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING
ACREE (PRESIDING JUDGE)
DIXON (CONCURS) AND LAMBERT (CONCURS)
2009-CA-002157-MR
TO BE PUBLISHED
FLOYD

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellants appeal the Floyd Circuit Court’s order awarding attorney fees to the Appellee, the Estate of Herman Lester. Specifically, the question presented is whether an attorney who withdraws from representation is entitled to recover his fee pursuant to the original contingency fee agreement, or limited to recovery on a quantum meruit basis. Upon the facts before us, we find quantum meruit is the proper calculation of fees. Therefore, we vacate the order of the Floyd Circuit Court and remand for additional proceedings.

Discovery work product; common law work product protection applied in this case which is broader thatn CR 2k6.02(3)(a) which is limited to parties by its plain language

Michael J. O’Connell, Et al. v. Honorable Frederic J. Cowan, Et al.

2009-SC-000596-MR        (Original Opinion: May 20, 2010; Modified: December 16, 2010)

Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Minton.  All sitting. Attorney, who had entered Alford plea to a criminal charge arising from threatening messages sent from his computer, filed a civil action alleging malicious prosecution and other claims against law enforcement officer and municipality after a related tampering with evidence charge was dismissed due to lack of probable cause (no evidence of tampering with computer).  Attorney sought to depose prosecutor, who was not a party to his civil action, and to obtain her entire litigation file relating to the prosecution of criminal charges against him.  Although providing attorney with some written discovery, prosecutor claimed that further discovery (including deposition and provision of remainder of litigation file) was barred due to work product protection.  After trial court ruled that attorney was entitled to the requested discovery, prosecutor unsuccessfully sought a writ to bar the discovery requests from the Court of Appeals. 

Supreme Court granted the writ.  Upon grant of rehearing, Supreme Court’s holdings include: that broader common-law work product protection applied, although facts did not technically support the application of Kentucky Civil Rule 26.02(3)(a), which provides work product protection to parties only by its plain language.

Supreme Court further held that, in light of circumstances unique to prosecutors, discovery of a prosecutor’s opinion work product was permitted only if the requestor met a heightened standard of showing a compelling need for the discovery.  Thus, Supreme Court reversed Court of Appeals, with directions to instruct trial court on remand to re-evaluate the request for discovery of prosecutor’s opinion work product under the heightened “compelling need” standard and conduct an in camera review of the material before permitting discovery of such information. Justice Schroder concurred in result only.

Attorneys Fees, Class Action: Bonar v. Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A. (COA 10/16/2009)

Bonar v. Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A.
2007-CA-001374 10/16/09 2009 WL 3336065 Rehearing Pending
Opinion by Judge Dixon; Judge Nickell and Senior Judge Knopf concurred.

The Court affirmed a judgment of the circuit court ruling that the appellant attorney was not entitled to any attorney’s fees from a class action lawsuit involving child sexual abuse against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington. The Court ultimately held that the trial court properly denied the request for attorney’s fees. In reaching that conclusion the Court first held that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment. The denial was not interlocutory and not reviewable on appeal. Further, appellant could not have been prejudiced because she was provided the right to establish the merits of her position during trial. The Court next held that the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s individual claims against two class attorneys. Appellant entered into an agreed order specifying that the firm was the proper defendant, there was no merit to appellant’s claim that she was forced to enter the agreed order, and she waived the issue upon the signing of the agreed order and the filing of an amended complaint. The Court next held that the trial court properly limited appellant’s access to discovery as to other class actions and practices regarding fee splitting and opting out class members as the information did not have any correlation to whether appellant was entitled to a fee. The Court next held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting testimony regarding other counsels’ fee arrangements that had no relevance to whether appellant was entitled to a fee or if so, how much. The Court next held that the trial court properly excluded appellant’s expert evidence when appellant failed to show that the retired former judge possessed any specialized knowledge that would assist the trial court, since the trial court did not need guidance on the ultimate issues to be decided. The Court next held that appellant was not denied a fair trial as the trial court’s comments regarding her ethical violations could not improperly influence the same court during the bench trial. The Court next held that there was no merit to the claim that the trial court erred by entering orders that were inconsistent with prior court rulings. First, the issue was unpreserved as appellant failed to raise it in her prehearing statement as required by CR 76.03(8). Further, the prior judge in the case did not enter an order on the record that could be construed the law of the case. The Court next held that the trial court did not err in relying on Baker v. Shapero, 203 S.W.3d 697 (Ky. 2006), in addressing the proper measure for the allowance of a fee. Because the trial court concluded that appellant voluntarily withdrew from the case due to a conflict of interest, the appropriate method of determining what compensation she was owed was based on quantum meruit. Even if appellant could prove that she had a binding fee agreement, it could not be enforced when she voluntarily withdrew in the initial stages of the case. The Court next held that the trial court’s findings with respect to appellant’s ethical violations were based upon substantial evidence in the record that she violated SCR 3.130(1.3), (1.7), (1.9), and (1.16).

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: SCOKY for October 2009

A. Kentucky Bar Association v. Roger P. Elliott
2009-SC-000549-KB October 29, 2009

The Supreme Court entered an order confirming attorney’s automatic suspension pursuant to SCR 3.166(1). The rule mandates an automatic suspension from the practice of law for any attorney that pleads guilty to a felony, effective the day following the plea. The attorney had pled guilt to theft of services already rendered, in violation of KRS 514.090.


B. Kentucky Bar Association v. David R. Steele
2009-SC-000246-KB October 29, 2009

The attorney was publicly censured by the Supreme Court of Tennessee for his handling of two personal injury claims. The Supreme Court of Tennessee determined that the attorney had 1) accepted a referral from an unregistered intermediary, 2) prospectively limited his malpractice liability, 3) represented both clients despite a conflict of interest between the clients; and 4) distributed the settlement proceeds from both cases in a single check with the required letter of explanation. In response to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s show cause order, the attorney argued that he should not be subject to reciprocal discipline since the same clients had also filed a bar complaint against him in Kentucky and the matter had been dismissed for adjudication in Tennessee, where the alleged misconduct occurred. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the attorney had not alleged fraud or lack of jurisdiction in Tennessee or that his misconduct warranted a different discipline in Kentucky. Accordingly, the Court issued a public reprimand to the attorney.


C. Kentucky Bar Association v. Luann C. Glidewell
2009-SC-000462-KB October 29, 2009

The Supreme Court ordered attorney suspended from the practice of law for 181 days. In one case, the attorney failed to respond to a show cause order, causing her client’s case to be dismissed. In the other, the attorney failed to file a timely answer resulting in a default judgment against her client. The attorney represented to the client’s new legal counsel that she would file a motion to set aside the default judgment-- even though her license was suspended at the time.


D. Kentucky Bar Association v. Gregory Curtis Menefee
2009-SC-000467-KB October 29, 2009

Ordered attorney permanently disbarred as a result of ten separate disciplinary files against him. Attorney was found to have repeatedly accepted funds from his bankruptcy clients intended for creditors and then failed to make the payments, refund the money or offer an accounting. The Court held that in light of the attorney’s failure to respond to disciplinary authorities and the potential criminal nature of his actions, permanent disbarment was the appropriate sanction.


E. Kentucky Bar Association v. Bruce D. Atherton
2009-SC-000560-KB October 29, 2009

The Supreme Court entered an order confirming attorney’s automatic suspension pursuant to SCR 3.166(1). The rule mandates an automatic suspension from the practice of law for any attorney that pleads guilty to a felony, effective the day following the plea. The attorney pled guilty to federal charges of accessory after the fact to a conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: SCOKY for October 29, 2009

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

A. Kentucky Bar Association v. Roger P. Elliott
2009-SC-000549-KB October 29, 2009

The Supreme Court entered an order confirming attorney’s automatic suspension pursuant to SCR 3.166(1). The rule mandates an automatic suspension from the practice of law for any attorney that pleads guilty to a felony, effective the day following the plea. The attorney had pled guilt to theft of services already rendered, in violation of KRS 514.090.


B. Kentucky Bar Association v. David R. Steele
2009-SC-000246-KB October 29, 2009

The attorney was publicly censured by the Supreme Court of Tennessee for his handling of two personal injury claims. The Supreme Court of Tennessee determined that the attorney had 1) accepted a referral from an unregistered intermediary, 2) prospectively limited his malpractice liability, 3) represented both clients despite a conflict of interest between the clients; and 4) distributed the settlement proceeds from both cases in a single check with the required letter of explanation. In response to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s show cause order, the attorney argued that he should not be subject to reciprocal discipline since the same clients had also filed a bar complaint against him in Kentucky and the matter had been dismissed for adjudication in Tennessee, where the alleged misconduct occurred. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the attorney had not alleged fraud or lack of jurisdiction in Tennessee or that his misconduct warranted a different discipline in Kentucky. Accordingly, the Court issued a public reprimand to the attorney.


C. Kentucky Bar Association v. Luann C. Glidewell
2009-SC-000462-KB October 29, 2009

The Supreme Court ordered attorney suspended from the practice of law for 181 days. In one case, the attorney failed to respond to a show cause order, causing her client’s case to be dismissed. In the other, the attorney failed to file a timely answer resulting in a default judgment against her client. The attorney represented to the client’s new legal counsel that she would file a motion to set aside the default judgment-- even though her license was suspended at the time.


D. Kentucky Bar Association v. Gregory Curtis Menefee
2009-SC-000467-KB October 29, 2009

Ordered attorney permanently disbarred as a result of ten separate disciplinary files against him. Attorney was found to have repeatedly accepted funds from his bankruptcy clients intended for creditors and then failed to make the payments, refund the money or offer an accounting. The Court held that in light of the attorney’s failure to respond to disciplinary authorities and the potential criminal nature of his actions, permanent disbarment was the appropriate sanction.


E. Kentucky Bar Association v. Bruce D. Atherton
2009-SC-000560-KB October 29, 2009

The Supreme Court entered an order confirming attorney’s automatic suspension pursuant to SCR 3.166(1). The rule mandates an automatic suspension from the practice of law for any attorney that pleads guilty to a felony, effective the day following the plea. The attorney pled guilty to federal charges of accessory after the fact to a conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud.

EMPLOYMENT - Workers compesation, retaliatory discrimination, attorneys fees: Colorama, Inc. v. Johnson (COA 9/4/2009)

Colorama, Inc. v. Johnson

2008-CA-000443 9/4/09 2009 WL 2834950 Released for pub. Opinion by Judge Caperton; Judges Thompson and Wine concurred. The court affirmed a judgment entered subsequent to a jury verdict finding that the employer retaliated or discriminated against a worker for filing a workers’ compensation claim

The Court first held that the worker met his burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination Filing the workers’ compensation claim was an activity expressly protected under KRS 342.197, the employer knew that he had done so, the jury’s factual finding that the worker was terminated was not clearly erroneous, and the worker presented sufficient evidence for the jury to believe he was terminated in retaliation for seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The Court distinguished the case from Wymer v. JH Properties, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195 (Ky. 2001), because the worker in the instant case was released to return to work without restriction, he said he wanted to try to perform the work and he may have been able to assume a light duty position. While the evidence might have been conflicting, it was for the jury to weigh the evidence and reach a conclusion. Therefore, the Court did not err in denying the employer’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court finally held that the award of attorney fees and costs were authorized by KRS 342.197(3) and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the award. Even so, the employer’s failure to name the worker’s attorney as a party to the appeal ultimately precluded review of the issue.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: SCOKY for September 2009 (dtd in Oct. 1 2009 minutes)

A. Kentucky Bar Association v. Patrick Edward Moeves
2009-SC-000270-KB October 1, 2009

Attorney was ordered to show cause why the Court should not impose reciprocal discipline after the Ohio Supreme Court prohibited the attorney from appearing pro hac vice in that state for two years. The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the attorney and his firm entered into an agreement with a non-accredited consumer debt counseling agency to represent people whose homes were in foreclosure. Generally, the agency would attempt to negotiate a settlement with the lender while the attorney would file boilerplate pleadings and motions with the court. In the event of a judgment for the lender, the law firm would send a form letter advising the client to contact a bankruptcy attorney. No alternate remedies were considered, and the firm never actually met with the client. The Ohio Supreme Court determined the attorney violated numerous ethical rules, including aiding non-lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law, sharing legal fees with non-lawyers, forming a partnership with nonlawyers and handling legal matters without adequate preparation. The attorney argued that he should not be given a two-year suspension in Kentucky since that was not the equivalent of a two year injunction against pro hac vice practice in Ohio. The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed, noting that the other members of attorney’s firm who were licensed in Ohio had received a public reprimand and a conditionally discharged one year suspension, respectively. Accordingly, the Court imposed a one year suspension, conditionally discharged for two years. Justice Venters not sitting./


B. Bruce A. Smith v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000336-KB October 1, 2009

The Supreme Court restores attorney’s license to practice law. The attorney had previously voluntarily withdrawn from the Kentucky bar in 2005.

C. Julia Belle Langerak v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000372-KB October 1, 2009

The Supreme Court ordered attorney reinstated to the practice of law. The attorney had previously been suspended for non-payment of KBA dues.

D. Kentucky Bar Association v. Joseph A. Yocum
2009-SC-000403-KB October 1, 2009

Attorney, appearing pro hac vice in a Kentucky workers’ compensation case, was determined by the ALJ to have filed medical report forms with the court which were completed by the attorney rather than physicians as required. At the ALJ’s request, the attorney produced his out-of-state certification form, from which the ALJ determined that the attorney had filed the petition months before being certified by the KBA. After the ALJ entered an order finding the attorney had committed workers’ compensation fraud, the attorney’s local co-counsel (required for pro hac vice practice under SCR 3.030(2)) withdrew from the case. Despite this, the attorney continued to file motions and pleadings in the case. The attorney attributed the Inquiry Commission’s subsequent charges against him to the KBA’s bias against Indiana attorneys.

The Supreme Court adopted the trial commissioner’s finding that Yocum was guilty of unlawfully altering a document that had evidentiary value (SCR 3.130-3.49(a)), engaging in the unauthorized practice of law (SCR 3.130-5.5(a)), and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation (SCR 3.130-8.4). The Court ordered the attorney prohibited from seeking permission to practice law in Kentucky for 120 days. Justice Schroder concurred in result only and would have suspended the attorney for one year. Justice Venters not sitting.

E. Jacqueline L. Chauvin v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000404-KB October 1, 2009

The Court granted attorney’s motion for a five year suspension from the practice of law, resolving five separate KBA files representing 23 charged violations. The attorney admitted to multiple instances of failing to act with due diligence, failing to communicate with clients, failing to return unearned fees, conduct involving fraud deceit, dishonesty or misrepresentation, failing to expedite her clients’ cases and failing to respond to a disciplinary authority, among other charges. In addition to the suspension, the attorney was ordered to participate in a supervision agreement with KYLAP and to reimburse her former clients. Justice Venters not sitting.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: SCOKY for Month of August 2009

A. James Wiley Craft v. Kentucky Bar Association
2002-SC-000273-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court reinstated attorney to the practice of law. The attorney had previously resigned under terms of disbarment after a felony conviction. The Court noted that the attorney had shown by clear and convincing evidence that he possessed sufficient professional capabilities and moral character.


B. Gregory A. Gabbard v. Kentucky Bar Association
2007-SC-000459-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court reinstated attorney to the practice of law. The attorney had been suspended in 2004 for professional misconduct. The reinstatement was conditional on the attorney entering into a supervision agreement with KYLAP.


C. Kentucky Bar Association, CLE Commission v. Michael Ray McDonner
2008-SC-000963-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court suspended attorney from the practice of law for failure to complete required CLE. Further the attorney did not respond to the CLE Commission’s attempts to communicate with the attorney.


D. Kentucky Bar Association v. George Martin Streckfus
2009-SC-000184-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline against attorney suspended in another jurisdiction. The Indiana Supreme Court had previously suspended the attorney for failing to respond to a complaint lodged against him and otherwise refusing to cooperate with the disciplinary process.


E. Kentucky Bar Association v. James Kevin Mathews
 2009-SC-000266-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court suspended attorney from the practice of law for 181 days for violating SCR 3.130-1.15(a) by failing to keep his clients’ money separate from his own after the KBA received 13 overdraft notices regarding attorney’s escrow account. The attorney was also found guilty of failing to respond to a lawful request for information from a disciplinary authority.


F. Kentucky Bar Association v. Leo A. Marcum
2009-SC-000267-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court suspended attorney from the practice of law for 181 days. Attorney was found to have violated SCR 3.130-1.15(a), which requires lawyers to hold his or her own property separate from that of a client. Attorney also violated the rule against engaging in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty or deceit (SCR 3.130(8.4)(c)).


G. Kim Allen Clay v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000272-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court granted attorney’s motion to resign under terms of permanent disbarment. The attorney previously pled guilty to federal charges of conspiracy to commit mail, wire and bank fraud. The attorney also admitted that he kept money given to him by his clients intended for their creditors.


H. Judy W. Sipes v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000304-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court granted attorney’s motion for Court to impose sanction of public reprimand. Attorney admitted to violating SCR 3.130(4.2) during the course of her representation in a suit against the City of Elizabethtown. The attorney interviewed a city employee who was represented by city attorneys without first obtaining the attorneys’ permission.

I. James Blake Hornal v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000320-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court reinstated attorney to the practice of law. The attorney was suspended in 2008 for failure to pay KBA dues.

J. Richard Erpenbeck v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000354-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court granted attorney’s motion for Court to impose a two year suspension from the practice of law. Attorney admitted that he failed to competently and diligently represent the bank that employed him to perform title searches. Attorney also admitted to failing to disclose to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court that his brother, while indebted to several creditors, transferred stock without any consideration to a company managed by the attorney.


K. Pamela C. Bratcher v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000358-KB August 27, 2009

Chief Justice Minton not sitting. The Supreme Court granted attorney’s motion for Court to impose sanction of public reprimand. Attorney admitted to violating SCR 3.130(4.2) which prohibits a lawyer from communicating about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by counsel. The attorney, while representing a client in a wrongful termination case, hired an agency to find out the type of reference the former employer was giving about her client. The agency contacted the former employer on the pretense of being a prospective employer. The attorney then attempted to use this information in the lawsuit. The trial court suppressed the information and disqualified the attorney from the case.


L. James R. Gregory, Sr. v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000369-KB August 27, 2009

The Supreme Court granted attorney’s motion for a three year suspension from the practice of law retroactive to January 2007. In 2004, attorney was suspended for 30 days, but failed to inform at least five clients of his suspension, to their detriment. The attorney also admitted to not refunding unearned fees and not appearing on behalf of his clients at crucial hearings. The attorney attributed these violations to his former substance abuse problem. Attorney’s reinstatement was made contingent on paying restitution to his clients and complying with a KYLAP supervision agreement.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: SCOKY for June 2009

Randall V. Head v. Kentucky Bar Association
2002-SC-000164-KB June 25, 2009
The Supreme Court reinstated attorney to the KBA. Attorney was suspended in 1997 and satisfied all requirements for reinstatement, including CLE, reinstatement bar exam and approval by the Character and Fitness Committee.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS: SCOKY May 2009

A. Stanley Brown v. Kentucky Bar Association
2007-SC-000455-KB May 21, 2009

Attorney was disbarred in Kentucky in 1995. At that time, the rules did not provide for permanent disbarment, and attorney could seek reinstatement after five years. The attorney was subsequently permanently disbarred in Ohio in 1997. In 2007, he sought reinstatement to the Kentucky bar. The Court ordered the attorney to show cause, in light of the Ohio disbarment, why he should not be subject to permanent disbarment in Kentucky under the reciprocal discipline rule (SCR 3.435). The attorney argued that at most, his reciprocal discipline should be disbarment for five years after which he could seek reinstatement since that was the severest sanction possible in Kentucky at the time when he was disciplined in Ohio. Further, the attorney argued that the five-year period should run from the date of his Ohio disbarment.

The Court agreed that appropriate sanction should be suspension for five years after which he may apply for reinstatement. However, the Court made the suspension effective from the date of its order, noting that the attorney failed to notify the KBA of his Ohio disbarment when it occurred, as required under SCR 3.435(1). Further, the attorney did not reveal the extent of the Ohio discipline in his 2007 application for reinstatement to the Kentucky bar. The Court lauded the attorney’s steps to seek treatment for addiction issues, but noted those efforts did not offset his “habitual lack of candor.” The Chief Justice dissented on the grounds that he would impose permanent disbarment.

B. Kentucky Bar Association v. Brentley P. Smith
2008-SC-000523-KB May 21, 2009
2009-SC-000094-KB May 21, 2009

The Supreme Court adopted the KBA Board of Governor’s recommendation of permanent disbarment of attorney based on 73 violations of the Rules of Profession Conduct stemming from 12 consolidated disciplinary cases against him. The attorney did not respond to, or otherwise defend against, the charges.

C. Kentucky Bar Association v. William J. Grider
2009-SC-000101-KB May 21, 2009

The Supreme Court adopted the KBA Board of Governor’s recommendation to suspend attorney for 30 days. Attorney accepted $500 to pursue an expungement, but took no action in the matter, despite client’s repeated attempts to discuss the case. The attorney was found to have failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness (SCR 3.130-1.3), failed to keep his client reasonably informed (SCR 3.130-1.4(a)), failed to return an unearned fee (SCR 3.130-1.16(d)) and failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority (SCR 3.130-8.1(b)).

D. Kentucky Bar Association v. James Kevin Mathews
2009-SC-000102-KB May 21, 2009

The Supreme Court adopted the KBA Board of Governor’s recommendation to suspend attorney for 181 days. Attorney was found to have accepted money from two separate clients, but took no further action beyond filing a complaint. The clients tried unsuccessfully to contact the attorney and subsequently learned that he had closed his law office. The Court noted that the attorney did not respond to the charges and has been serving a suspension since January 2008 for failing to pay bar dues.

E. Ferdinand R. Radolovich v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000128-KB May 21, 2009

The Supreme Court granted attorney’s motion to resign from the bar under terms of permanent disbarment. Attorney admitted to inducing client to make an agreement prospectively limiting liability for legal malpractice, in violation of SCR 3.130-1.8(h), and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation (SCR 3.130-8.3(c)). Attorney had also been held in contempt by the Sixth Circuit for failing to pay opposing party’s attorney fees and costs associated with an appeal deemed to be “incoherent and frivolous.” Attorney admitted to incorrectly advising a client whether her guilty plea to a fraud charge would result in a misdemeanor or felony conviction. Attorney also admitted to incorrectly advising the same client whether her settlement proceeds from sexual harassment suit would be taxable income. Lastly, attorney admitted he did not provide truthful testimony during a hearing in Jefferson Circuit Court—which led to his indictment on perjury charges. As part of his plea agreement in that matter, the attorney agreed to notify the KBA of his request for permanent disbarment.

F. Keith U. Laurin v. Kentucky Bar Association
2009-SC-000192-KB May 21, 2009

The Supreme Court granted attorney’s motion for public reprimand with conditions on charges arising from his representation of a client seeking to form a tax-exempt organization. The attorney admitted that he did not provide competent representation (SCR 3.130-1.1), that he did not act with reasonable diligence (SCR 3.130-1.3), and that he did not adequately respond to the client’s reasonable requests for information about the status of the case (SCR 3.130-1.4(a)). The Court also ordered the attorney to attend remedial ethics CLE.