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April 2008

LAWWIRE: Feb. 29, 2008 - KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS (2008:11)(COA)

Feb. 29, 2008 -  KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS (2008:11)

De facto custodians must be determined before determining custody between two sets of grandparents: BAKER V. COMBS (COA 2/29/2008)

BAKER V. COMBS
FAMILY LAW:  Child custody and de facto custodian
2007-CA-001013
PUBLISHED: VACATING AND REMANDING
PANEL:  KELLER PRESIDING; THOMPSON, WINE CONCUR
COUNTY: KNOX
DATE RENDERED: 2/29/2008

Mother appealed from TC’s order denying her motion for custody of her natural child and awarding continued permanent custody to Paternal Grandmother and Step-Grandfather (“Paternal Grandparents”). Mother and Father were never married, and Father never participated in the action or otherwise sought custody of Child. Mother is now married and has another child.

Child was first removed from Mother and placed in the temporary custody of CFC in January 2004 by Whitley District Court (“Whitley DC”) on the basis of Mother’s drug use and the fact that she left Child with Paternal Grandparents for the preceding two months; CFC placed Child with Paternal Grandparents. After adjudication hearing but before disposition hearing, Whitley DC transferred the case to the Laurel District Court (“Laurel DC”). Laurel DC, after permanency hearing, subsequently ordered that the permanency plan was placement with a permanent custodian pursuant to CFC’s recommendation and named Paternal Grandparents as the permanent custodians. Laurel DC entered a permanent custody order the same day, presumably naming Paternal Grandparents as Child’s permanent custodians, although the order portion of the preprinted AOC-DNA-9 form was not completed.

In the Findings of Fact portion of the form, Laurel DC indicated that it considered factors relating to a prior independent finding that a de facto custodian existed. However, CA found that the record did not contain any document reflecting a prior independent finding that a de facto custodian situation existed in this case.

Eight months later, Maternal Grandparents and Mother filed a Verified Petition for Custody in the Knox Family Court (“Knox FC”), as this was the home county of Paternal Grandparents and Child, requesting custody to Maternal Grandparents or to Mother. Knox FC permitted Mother supervised visitation with Child and ordered that she submit to random drug tests, each of which revealed a negative result. A year and a half later, Mother moved Knox FC for custody of Child, stating that she had complied with the court’s order that she rehabilitate herself, that she was married, and that she was leading a stable life. After hearing in which Mother’s witnesses testified that she had overcome her past problems with drug abuse, that she was currently a different person, and that she was capable of raising Child, and testimony regarding Mother’s past drug use and her past actions in leaving Child with Paternal Grandparents for extended periods of time, Knox FC denied Mother’s motion on the record, noting that Child had been in Paternal Grandparents’ home for more than 3 years and that the benefits of changing custody would not outweigh the harm in doing so. Knox FC entered an order to this effect, finding that it would not be in Child’s best interest to remove him from the Paternal Grandparents’ home and awarding Mother standard, unsupervised visitation.

Mother argued to CA that Knox FC erred in awarding custody to Paternal Grandparents, because they were not de facto custodians and she was not unfit. Paternal Grandparents asserted that Laurel DC decided the issue of de facto custodians, so that any further adjudication on this issue would be barred by res judicata, and that they are de facto custodians.

CA noted that a de facto custodian is defined in KRS 403.270(1)(a) as: :[A] person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services.” CA stated that once it determines that such a person is a de facto custodian, TC shall give the person the same standing in custody matters that is given to each parent under this section, and determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child.

CA found that there was no prior finding that Paternal Grandparents were de facto custodians, nor were there any findings that Paternal Grandparents were the primary caregivers and financial supporters of Child for the required statutory period, despite the fact that the form AOC-DNA-9 had some boxes checked in this regard. Therefore, before Knox FC may determine custody as between Mother and Paternal Grandparents using a best interests standard, CA held it must first independently decide that Paternal Grandparents are de facto custodians. As such a finding had never been made, CA vacated Knox FC’s order and remanded for a determination of whether Paternal Grandparents meet the requirements to be de facto custodians.

As digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Inmate has no right to grand jury transcipts following post-conviction motion: WAGNER V. COM (COA 2/29/2008)

WAGNER V. COM
CRIMINAL:  Post Conviction; transcripts

2006-CA-000900
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: STUMBO PRESIDING; ACREE, GRAVES CONCUR
COUNTY: BELL
DATE RENDERED: 2/29/2008

Inmate was not entitled to transcripts of his grand jury proceedings following post-conviction motion.  Further, TC did not err by failing to issue findings of facts and conclusions of law.

Scott Byrd

Waiver of right to arbitrate must be voluntary and intentional and not inferred lightly: WEIS BUILDERS, INC. V. COMPLETE CONTRACTING, INC. (COA 2/29/2008)

WEIS BUILDERS, INC. V. COMPLETE CONTRACTING, INC.
ARBITRATION: WAIVER

2007-CA-000700
PUBLISHED: REVERSING AND REMANDING
PANEL:  STUMBO PRESIDING; ACREE, GRAVES CONCUR
COUNTY: POWELL
DATE RENDERED: 2/29/2008

Weis appealed arguing the circuit court improperly concluded that Weis waived its unilateral authority to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of a contract between the parties.  At issue was correspondence wherein counsel for Weis Builders stated,“[a ]t this point in time, Weis Builders ’ preference is to litigate the dispute rather than arbitrate it, although this is open to discussion.”  Complete Contracting would later maintain that this statement represented Weis Builders ’ decision under the contract to proceed with litigation rather than arbitration. Conversely, Weis Builders would argue that the letter evidenced no decision, but rather was merely an invitation to discuss the matter.

COA held the circuit court erred in determining that Weis Builders waived its contractual right to resolve the dispute through arbitration.  A waiver may be either express or implied,although waiver will not be inferred lightly.” Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation v..Wilder ,47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky.App.2001).

The statement that it was Weis's “preference is to litigate ” did not constitute “a voluntary and intentional surrender or relinquishment of a known right.” One may not reasonably conclude that Weis Builders would be “open to discussing ” its “preference ” if it were not preserving the right to change that preference.

Michael Stevens

LAWWIRE: Feb. 22, 2008 - KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS (2008:10)(COA)

Feb. 22, 2008 -  KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS (2008:10)

Teacher's injury at convention with students arose out of employment for workers comp claim: CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF ED. V. JACOBS (COA 2/22/2008)

CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF ED. V. JACOBS
WORKERS COMP:  Arising out of employment
2007-CA-001575
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL:  THOMPSON PRESIDING; NICKELL, VANMETER CONCUR
COUNTY: WCB
DATE RENDERED: 2/22/2008

The Court affirmed an award of disability benefits to a teacher who fell while attending a beta-club convention with her students out of town. The Court held that the activity benefited the employer, and therefore arose out of employment even though it occurred away from the employer’s premises.

Peter Naake

Physician's satellite offices primarily for diagnostic testing not included in KRS 216B.010 certificate of need: GILBERT, M.D. V. COM. CAB. FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SVCS. (COA 2/22/2008)

GILBERT, M.D.  V. COM. CAB. FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SVCS.
MEDICAL FACILITY LICENSURE: APPLICABILITY OF EXEMPTION TO CERTIFICATE OF NEED REQUIREMENT

2007-CA-000042

PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: ACREE PRESIDING; KELLER, MOORE CONCUR
COUNTY: FRANKLIN
DATE RENDERED: 2/22/2008

John Gilbert, a well-known neurologist based in Lexington, his medical company and his satellite offices (collectively "Gilbert") appeal the TC's Order affirming the decision of the Cabinet for Health & Family Services finding Dr. Gilbert in violation of KRS 216B.010, et seq., by operating health facilities with MRI services in London, Hazard and Florence without first obtaining a certificate of need ("CON"). Gilbert's main contention on appeal was that his facilities are exempt from licensure per KRS 216B.020(2)(a), which exempts "private offices and clinics of physicians, dentists and other practioners of the healing arts." The Cabinet deemed this statute inapplicable since Gilbert did not actively practice at the 3 satellite offices and thus could not be considered a physician's "private office." Gilbert conversely argued that the statute includes no element of personal active participation at the offices, only ownership.
    
The COA began its analysis by ruling that since both party's interpretation of the subject statute was reasonable, the statute was ambiguous not on its face but as applied, and therefore constituted a latent ambiguity. The COA then turned to the legislative intent, and first noted its agreement with Gilbert that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit or discourage any physician from establishing satellite offices in medically underserved communities such as Hazard and London in this instance by permitting the exemption only if the physician owner personally and actively participated in the practice at each office. To remove any doubt, the COA affirmatively held that no such personal, active participation is required. On the other hand, the COA felt that the real focus of the Cabinet's inquiry should have instead been on the kind of activity that usually takes place at the office for which an exemption is sought. To this end, Gilbert had the burden of demonstrating to the Cabinet that the exemption was, in fact, available and applicable to each of the 3 offices.
         
The COA's review of the official record found that each of the 3 offices were primarily used as diagnostic facilities for patients referred by other physicians and were not used primarily to obtain scans for diagnosis of Gilbert's own patients as he claimed. The evidence showed that no licensed physician was even actively present at the two eastern Kentucky offices while the physician who did work at the Florence office only read the films from the MRI scans performed at that office on patients referred by other physicians. Thus, the COA concluded that all three offices had all the hallmarks of a diagnostic testing facility. As such, the exemption under KRS 216B.020(2)(a) did not apply and a CON was needed for all three facilities on an individual basis, which Gilbert had failed to obtain. The TC's Order sustaining the ultimate decision of the Cabinet was affirmed by the COA.

By Chad Kessinger, Schiller Osbourn Barnes & Maloney

Juvenile DNA collection and testing limited: PETITIONER F v. BROWN (COA 2/22/2008)

PETITIONER "F" V. BROWN
CRIMINAL:  Juvenile DNA Testing
2006-CA-002450
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
PANEL: VANMETER PRESIDING; COMBS, MOORE CONCUR
COUNTY: FRANKLIN
DATE RENDERED: 2/22/2008

The issue in this appeal is whether the Franklin Circuit Court erred by granting summary judgment in Brown's favor as to whether the DJJ could collect DNA samples from seven unnamed juveniles. For the following reasons, CA affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

KRS 17.174 applies to juveniles who have been adjudicated public offenders for the commission or attempted commission of offenses defined in KRS 17.170 or KRS 17.171. However, the statutes do not require samples to be taken from juveniles who have been adjudicated of burglary. The DJJ was not required to promulgate any administrative regulations prior to its implementation of DNA sampling as required by KRS 17.174. Weighing the totality of these circumstances, the collection of the appellants' DNA samples is reasonable, and does not violate the appellants' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Digested by Scott C. Byrd
www.olginandbyrd.com

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTLA) is not a federal medical malpractice act: OHIO COUNTY HOSP. CORP. V. TINA MARTIN, ADMIN. OF EST. OF BILLIE CAROL SHREVE, DECEASED; AND DONALD RAY SHREVE, INDIVIDUALLY (COA 2/22/2008)

OHIO COUNTY HOSP. CORP. V. TINA MARTIN, ADMIN. OF EST. OF BILLIE CAROL SHREVE, DECEASED; AND DONALD RAY SHREVE, INDIVIDUALLY 
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE:  EMTLA (Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act)
2006-CA-002248
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
PANEL: BUCKINGHAM PRESIDING; THOMPSON CONCURS W/SEP. OP.; TAYLOR CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY IN PART AND FILES SEP. OP.
COUNTY: HARDIN
DATE RENDERED: 2/22/2008

CA affirms in part, reverses in part, vacates in part, and remands this case alleging medical malpractice and EMTALA violations.

Decedent was in an automobile collision, transported to Ohio County Hospital, and evaluated by an RN and ER doctor, reporting discomfort. Her condition deteriorated and approximately 90 minutes later she became unconscious. The doctor diagnosed shock and likely hemorrhaging, ordering a CT scan to determine its location. Decedent received blood transfusions. With the scans, the doctor found abdominal bleeding requiring surgery. Finding no surgeons available, the doctor made arrangements to transport her to Owensboro for surgery. She bled to death by the time she reached Owensboro.

Appellees sued, alleging med mal and EMTALA violations, i.e., 1) failure to screen; and 2) failure to stabilize. The doctor settled before trial. The jury found 50% liability each for doctor and hospital (none for other driver) and awarded nearly $100,000 for destruction of power to earn money and pain and suffering and $250,000 for husband's loss of consortium. Hospital appealed, arguing the TC erred in not granted directed verdicts.

CA holds that EMTALA is not intended to be a federal malpractice statute; it is intended to address patient "dumping" based upon inability to pay. Therefore, violation of EMTALA's screening requirement must be predicated upon a showing of improper motive, which was not shown here. Further, EMTALA's stabilization requirement does not prevent transfer, it merely conditions transfer on certain requirements, which were met here.

As to the loss of consortium claim, CA holds that the claim is only viable for the period between injury and death. It does not extend beyond. As no appreciable time had elapsed between the alleged injury and death in this case, the TC erred in not granted directed verdict. The med mal verdict should be affirmed, but, as the awarded damages were not segregated as to each claim, the award must be vacated and remanded for a new trial.

Digested by John E. Hamlet

Multiple issues regarding search and jury insructions still results in affirmance of conviction: NASH V. COM. (COA 2/22/2008)

NASH V. COM.
CRIMINAL:  Search warrants; Jury instructions

2005-CA-002179
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: HENRY PRESIDING; KELLER, TAYLOR CONCUR
COUNTY GRAYSON
DATE RENDERED: 2/22/2008

CA affirmed Defendant's convictions for possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Relying on Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1018-1019, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987), CA held suppression of the modified air tank was not required and the trial court did not err by declining to suppress that evidence. Although the search exceeded the scope of the search warrant, there is substantial evidence in the record that the officers' mistake was reasonable given the circumstances. There was no KRE 404(b) error by the admission of the statement that Nash used the modified air tank containing anhydrous ammonia in order to manufacture methamphetamine. TC did err by failing to provide a definition of "approved container" in the jury instructions; however, the error was harmless.

Scott Byrd
www.olginandbyrd.com