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November 2007

LawWire: NOVEMBER 1, 2007 SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY DECISIONS (Vol. 2007:52)

NOVEMBER 1, 2007 SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY DECISIONS (Vol. 2007:52)

Writ of Prohibition: EDWARDS V. HON. CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE (SC 11/1/2007)

EDWARDS V. HON. CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
WRIT OF PROHIBITION:
2005-SC-001021-MR.pdf
PUBLISHED: 1214 AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
OPINION WRITTEN BY -  NOBLE
DATE RENDERED:  10/31/2007

The Supreme Court denies Edwards' petition for writ of prohibition that sought to bar the enforcement of the trial court's Order compelling Edwards to disclose proprietary business records of both his company that is a named party as well as non-party companies he also owned as sole partner, the Court ruling that such documents were discoverable from Edwards under CR 34.01 for both the party and non-party companies since all requested records were undeniably in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request was served (Edwards).

Digested by James R. Chadword Kessinger
Schiller, Osbourn, Barnes & Maloney

Workers Comp Tolling SOL: SHELBY MOTOR CO., INC. V. QUIRE (SC 11/1/2007)

SHELBY MOTOR CO., INC.  V. QUIRE
WORKERS COMP:  Tolling of Statute of limitations and Preservation of Issues
2006-SC-000884-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: REVERSING; OPINION OF THE COURT
DATE RENDERED:  10/31/2007

The Supreme Court held that the claimant’s counsel failed to argue in his brief that the statute of limitations on a previous injury was tolled by payment of TTD on a subsequent injury to the same body part, thus abandoning that argument.

Digested by Peter Naake
Priddy, Cutler, Miller & Meade

Workers Comp Cumulative Trauma: UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY FAMILY PRACTICE V. LEACH (SC 11/1/2007)

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY FAMILY PRACTICE V. LEACH
WORKERS COMP:
Statute of Limitations and Cumulative Trauma
2007-SC-000051-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING; OPINION OF THE COURT 

The Supreme court affirmed an award of medical benefits based on cumulative trauma, which occurred over a several year period, finding that the last two years of cumulative trauma was sufficient to exacerbate the time-barred cumulative trauma.

Digested by Peter Naake
Priddy, Cutler, Miller & Meade

Workers Comp Reopening: RUSSELVILLE WAREHOUSING V. BASHAM, DECEASED (SC 11/1/2007)

RUSSELVILLE WAREHOUSING V. BASHAM, DECEASED
WORKERS COMP:  REOPENING
2006-SC-000885-WC.pdf
PUBLISHED: 862 AFFIRMING; OPINION  OF COURT
DATE RENDERED:  10/31/2007

Reopening was denied on the grounds of mistake or newly discovered evidence where autopsy showed a non-work related cause of the claimant’s condition, but the ALJ’s original decision in the claimant’s favor, while he was alive was not appealed.

Digested by Peter Naake
Priddy, Cutler, Miller & Meade

Medical Negligence: WITTEN, M.D. VS. BONNIE PACK, ADMINISTRATRIX (SC 11/1/2007)

WITTEN, M.D.  VS. BONNIE PACK, ADMINISTRATRIX
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE
2005-SC-000414-DG.pdf
PUBLISHED: REVERSING; OPINION WRITTEN BY -  SCOTT
DATE RENDERED:  10/31/2007

The Supreme Court denies Edwards' petition for writ of prohibition that sought to bar the enforcement of the trial court's Order compelling Edwards to disclose proprietary business records of both his company that is a named party as well as non-party companies he also owned as sole partner, the Court ruling that such documents were discoverable from Edwards under CR 34.01 for both the party and non-party companies since all requested records were undeniably in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request was served (Edwards).

Digested by Paul O'Bryan
O'Bryan and Denbow

Equitable Avoidance in Paternity: HINSHAW (NOW LENARZ) V. HINSHAW (SC 11/1/2007)

HINSHAW (NOW LENARZ) V. HINSHAW
FAMILY LAW: EQUITABLE AVOIDANCE AND PATERNITY
2006-SC-000729-DGE.pdf
PUBLISHED: 605 AFFIRMING; OPINION WRITTEN BY -  CUNNINGHAM
DATE RENDERED:  10/31/2007

Mom appealed CA’s opinion affirming TC’s order awarding joint custody of child to parents and primary residence to Dad, claiming that TC erred when it failed to resolve Dad’s custody rights based on DNA evidence indicating he was not biological father, and by applying equitable estoppel in its custody determination.

FACTS:
Mom gave birth to child during marriage of parties. At birth, Dad was in the delivery room, cut umbilical cord, and was named on birth certificate. Dad was led to believe that he was biological father to child, and was deeply involved in Child’s life as his father. Three and a half years later, Mom filed for divorce, and then amended her petition, alleging for the first time that Dad was not Child’s biological father and seeking court-ordered DNA testing to prove her claim. DNA evidence established that Dad was not Child’s biological father. TC appointed a custodial evaluator, who determined that the severance of Dad’s and Child’s relationship would result in severe emotional and psychological harm to Child. TC found that Mom was equitably estopped from challenging Dad’s custody rights based on DNA testing, that DNA test was irrelevant to issue of custody, and awarded joint custody to the parties with primary residence to be with Dad. CA affirmed TC on appeal.

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS:
Mom argued that DNA tests rebutted the presumption of paternity in KRS 406.011 and thus triggered the application of KRS 406.111, requiring a resolution of paternity. Mom further argued that equitable estoppel cannot be applied in custody cases and that even if applied, Dad failed to establish the necessary elements of equitable estoppel.

“A party asserting equitable estoppel must show the following elements: (1) Conduct, including acts, language and silence, amounting to a representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the estopped party is aware of these facts; (3) these facts are unknown to the other party; (4) the estopped party must act with the intention or expectation his conduct will be acted upon; and (5) the other party in fact relied on this conduct to his detriment.” SC found that all these requirements were met in this case, as Mom’s acts, language and silence were all aimed at misleading Dad into believing he was Child’s father and at developing the father-son relationship. Though Mom argued that Dad failed to show reliance and conduct to his detriment, pointing to the fact that Dad had testified that he would not have done anything differently in his relationship with Child, SC disagreed. SC noted that Dad’s willingness to continue his relationship with Child had he known the truth is not the same as saying he would have taken no action at all. Mom’s failure to inform Dad of Child’s paternity denied Dad the opportunity to seek legal advice as to the relationship with Child and his rights and obligations with regard to Mom and Biological Father. SC noted that it followed other jurisdictions in its determination that equitable estoppel could be applied in custody cases, and that KY CA had applied the common law principle of equitable estoppel in S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d 502 (Ky. App. 2005).
SC held that Mom, having encouraged Father/Son relationship between Dad and Child, could not now deny it, and that under the unique circumstances of the case, “equitable estoppel precludes [Mom] from challenging [Dad’s] status as [Child’s] father, a status she created and accepted.”

Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes
Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Confrontation: RANKINS V. COMMONWEALTH (SC 11/1/2007)

RANKINS V. COMMONWEALTH
CRIMINAL:  Right to Confrontation
2005-SC-000690-DG.pdf
PUBLISHED: REVERSING; OPINION WRITTEN BY -  SCHRODER
DATE RENDERED:  1`/1/2007

Hearsay statements of an assault victim who was not available to testify in domestic assault prosecution in Jefferson District Court should have been excluded pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U .S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). SC held it was not necessary to decide whether or not the statements qualified as "excited utterances", as the decision is controlled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U .S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004) and its progeny, Davis v. Washington, - U .S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006), and Hammon v. Indiana, decided with Davis.

Crawford held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of the testimonial statement of a declarant who does not appear at trial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford referred to "testimonial" statements, because it is statements of a testimonial character, as opposed to other hearsay, which cause the declarant to be a witness against the accused for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.

Here, the police officer responded to a call, and discovered the prosecuting witness. She proceeded to tell the officer "what happened," recounting the assault by Rankin . Under Davis and Crawford, the witness's statements are testimonial. The Sixth Amendment prescribes that the only method for testing their reliability is through cross-examination. Courts cannot consider whether they fit into the excited utterance, or any other hearsay exception. To do so "would perpetuate . . . what the Sixth Amendment condemns." Crawford, 541 U .S. at 67, 124 S. Ct. at 1373, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 202.

Digested by Scott C. Byrd
Olgin and Byrd

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: COMMONWEALTH V. BOWLES (SC 11/1/2007)

COMMONWEALTH V. BOWLES
CRIMINAL:  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
2005-SC-000039-DG.pdf
PUBLISHED: 445 REVERSING; OPINION WRITTEN BY -  CUNNINGHAM
DATE RENDERED:  11/01/2007

SC reversed CA and reinstated TC's order denying Defendant's RCr 11.42 motion to vacate alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Bowles' conviction for murder and life sentence reinstated. CA opinion focused on two issues: 1.) the failure of Bowles' attorney to object to the introduction of evidence of Bowles being involved in a hit and run driving accident over two weeks after the murder; and 2.) the failure of trial counsel to preserve objection over limited impeachment evidence concerning Bowles' brother's previous rape conviction. The alleged errors, alone or in combination, do not rise to the level of "errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed -defendant by the Sixth Amendment ."

Digested by Scott C. Byrd
Olgin and Byrd

Expert Disclosures: JONES V. COMMONWEALTH (SC 11/1/2007)

JONES V. COMMONWEALTH
CRIMINAL:  Expert opinions, disclosure
2005-SC-000879-DG.pdf
PUBLISHED: 1321 AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART;
OPINION WRITTEN BY -  MINTON
DATE RENDERED:  11/1/2007

SC reversed Defendant's convictions for incest, rape, and sodomy due to TC's limits on the testimony of Jones's DNA expert. Jones's conviction for bribing a witness is affirmed because the improper limitation on Dr. Melekovets's testimony had no discernible bearing upon that conviction .

Jones had furnished a copy of Dr. Melekovets's one-page report to the Commonwealth as pretrial discovery several months before trial. Dr. Melekovets's report indicated that he found no Y-chromosomes on the vaginal swab taken from M.G . Implicitly underlying that conclusion is the obvious fact that Dr. Melekovets fundamentally disagreed with the Commonwealth's DNA expert's conclusion that the male DNA found in the vaginal swab taken from M.G. matched Jones. After all, a lack of Y-chromosomes necessarily rules out a match for Jones's--or any other male's-DNA on the vaginal swab. In other words, it surely could not have come as a surprise to the Commonwealth that Dr. Melekovets would disagree with the conclusion and/or analytical process used by the Commonwealth's DNA expert in light of the conclusions contained in Dr. Melekovets's report. So, SC did not equate permitting Dr. Melekovets to explain why he found fault with the Commonwealth's DNA expert's conclusion and/or methodology to be impermissible "sandbagging ."

So the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the trial court properly limited Dr. Melekovets's testimony (because Jones committed a discovery violation when he did not provide the Commonwealth with the entire underlying bases for Dr. Melekovets's testimony) is premised upon an impermissibly broad interpretation of RCr 7.24. Therefore, since Jones provided the Commonwealth all that was required in discovery concerning Dr. Melekovets's report, the trial court erred when it relied upon RCr 7.24 to limit Dr. Melekovets's testimony.

On remand, the pornographic images found on Defendant's computer may not be introduced and shown to the jury unless a nexus is shown between the images and the victim's testimony.

Digested by Scott C. Byrd
Olgin and Byrd