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October 2007

LawWire: SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS (2006:46)

SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS (2006:46)

Disclaimer of Warranties: BROWN SPRINKLER CORP. V. PLUMBERS SUPPLY CO. (COA 9/21/2007)

BROWN SPRINKLER CORP. V. PLUMBERS SUPPLY CO.
BUSINESS LAW:  UCC; IMPLIED WARRANTY DISCLAIMER; PRIVITY

2006-CA-001667
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: COMBS, PRESIDING; ACREE CONCUR; TAYLOR CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
JEFFERSON COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

In June 2001, Brown Sprinkler discovered that water from the sprinkler system had begun to leak from some of the sprinkler heads that it had installed at the Lexington project. Brown contacted Globe directly. A Globe representative asked Brown to remove 50 sprinkler heads and to ship them to the manufacturer for inspection. Instead of just 50 sprinkler heads, Brown removed and shipped to Globe 1,825 sprinkler heads -- approximately ¼ of those originally installed.

Brown's complaint included claims for fraud and breach of warranty under Kentucky's version of the Uniform Commercial Code.   Globe and Plumbers Supply filed motions for summary judgment, both of which were granted.

The trial court concluded that Plumbers Supply and Globe were also entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Brown's breach of warranty claims. The court observed that Plumbers Supply had clearly and conspicuously disclaimed all warranties implied by law.  The trial court did not err by concluding that Plumbers Supply's disclaimer of implied warranties met the requirements of the statute. The court cited the statutory definition of conspicuous and noted that the disclaimer was located on the front of its customer invoice in readable size print -  disclaiming “all implied warranties including any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular use.”  Since, the language of the disclaimer is clear and adequate, and its presence is readily noticeable. Plumbers Supply did not make any implied warranties as a matter of law,  the court's summary judgment cannot be reversed on this basis.


The General Assembly expressly adopted the privity requirement, and the statute clearly limits warranty protections to those engaged in a buyer-seller relationship. Thus, the COA cannot modify or expand the impact of the legislation regardless of whatever compelling arguments may be made as to public policy concerns.

By Michael Stevens

Business Torts and Amending Complaints: KENNEY V. HANGER PROSTHETICS & ORTHOTICS, INC. (COA 9/21/2007)

KENNEY V. HANGER PROSTHETICS & ORTHOTICS, INC.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: AMENDING COMPLAINT
BUSINESS LAW: BUSINESS TORTS

2006-CA-000939
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: VANMETER PRESIDING; MOORE, STUMBO CONCUR
FAYETTE COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

This  Kentucky Court of Appeals decision provides a veritable grocery list of business related causes of action and their elements.

In the case, John M. Kenney had been an employee of Hanger Prosthetics, but ventured out on his own. Kenney and his company, Kenney Orthopedics, LLC, filed a petitioner alleging that Hanger employee Michael Adams made false representations about him, such as that he embezzled from Hanger and was barred from competing with Hanger per a non-compete contract provision, which harmed his business venture. Only Kenney's claim of breach of contract passed summary judgment while the defamation and tortious interference with business claims died there.

Since the litigation souffle made of the claims of tortious interference and defamation claims fell, Kenney attempted to make a stew instead by amending his complaint to incorporate a grocery list of other causes of action. The trial court refused to amend the petition. The breach of contract claim resulted in a hung jury and the trial court granted another summary judgment in Kenney's favor regarding his claim for a 4% commssion from Hanger. Kenney appealed the trial court's refusal to amend its complaint to incorporate the following list of claims accompanied by the definitions given by the Court of Appeals:

A. Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations
[t]he tort of interference with a prospective advantage is plagued with the absence of a uniformly recognized terminology. It has been referred to as the tort of interference with a business relationship, inducing refusal to deal, interference with a prospective economic advantage, interference with advantageous relations, interference with reasonable economic expectancies, or interference with prospective business expectancies. . . . The American Law Institute has named the tort "Intentional Interference with Prospective Contractual Relation."
. . . .
B. Defamation Per Quod
The difference between defamation per se and defamation per quod is that, in the former, damages are presumed and, in the latter, the plaintiff must prove special damages.. . . .

C. Unfair Competition/Trade Practices
[U]nfair competition consists of either (1) injuring the plaintiff by taking his business or impairing his good will, or (2) unfairly profiting by the use of the plaintiff's name, or a similar one, in exploiting his good will. Underlying the whole theory is the matter of actual or intended deception of the public for business reasons. . . . .

D. Slander of Title, Trade Libel/Disparagement, Injurious Falsehood
Corporations and other businesses can and do recover for libel or slander when they have been defamed by charges such as crime or fraud. But defamatory charges commonly made against individuals–adultery, for example–have little relevance to corporations and many of the imputations about corporations are harmful without being defamatory. When the publication asserts that the corporate product is defective, inadequate, or harmful without asserting personal defamation, the traditional view regards the claim as essentially different from the claim for defamation. The same is true if the publication merely says that the plaintiff has gone out of business. This different claim goes under the general name of injurious falsehood. When the publication attacks a product, it is also called trade libel or commercial disparagement. When the publication attacks title to property rather than quality of a product, the claim is likely to be called slander of title. . . . .

1. Slander of Title
[T]hat the defendant has knowingly and maliciously communicated, orally or in writing, a false statement which has the effect of disparaging the plaintiff's title to property; he must also plead and prove that he has incurred special damage as a result.
. . . .
2. Trade Libel/Disparagement
Trade libel involves disparaging and false assertions about the quality of one's property rather than title to it.
. . . .
3. Injurious Falsehood
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if (a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A (1977). . . . .

E. Illegal Restraint of Trade and Commerce
A restraint of trade may be adjudged unreasonable if it is per se unreasonable or violates the rule of reason. . . . Examples of per se unreasonable conduct include price-fixing arrangements, tying arrangements, agreements among competitors to divide markets or to allocate customers, group boycotts, and agreements to limit production. . . . Kenney has clearly not alleged any of these practices or any comparable practices. As for a restraint which violates the rule of reason, "showing merely injury to oneself as a competitor is insufficient." . . . . Thus, the trial court did not err by failing to permit Kenney to amend his claim in this regard.
(internal citations omitted)

The Court of Appeals found this cause of action stew rather bland and rejected each one of these attempts to amend the original complaint to survive summary judgment. The trial courts decision to disallow the complaint to be amended would not be disturbed unless it was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals noted that the interference claim and the defamation per quod claims were so similar to the original claims of tortious interference and plain old defamation that they would not have survived summary judgment either. The other causes of action simply were not sufficiently supported by the facts to be viable.

Gregory A. Napier
http://troutmanhays.wordpress.com/

Criminal, Habeas Corpus: BUSH V. COM. (COA 9/21/2007)

BUSH V. COM.
CRIMINAL: RCR 11.42 WAIVER, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

2006-CA-001372
PUBLISHED: DISMISSING
PANEL: DIXON PRESIDING; VANMETER AND GRAVES CONCUR
FRANKLIN COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

CA dismissed pro se inmate's appeal challenging the Circuit Court's denial of his motion for post-conviction relief alleging prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.  While CA opined that Bush failed to establish that he was entitled to relief pursuant to RCr 11.42, they did not reach the merits of his claims because his motion was untimely.  The trial court herein lost jurisdiction over Bush's case ten days after entry of the final judgment. Silverburg v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky. 1979). As Bush's motion was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations period mandated in RCr 11.42, it was insufficient to reinvest jurisdiction.

Digested by Scott C. Byrd

Criminal, Home Confinement: ELMORE V. COM. (COA 9/21/2007)

ELMORE V. COM.
CRIMINAL: PLEA AGREEMENT, HOME CONFINEMENT

2006-CA-001455
PUBLISHED: VACATING AND REMANDING
PANEL: COMBS PRESIDING; ACREE, TAYLOR CONCUR
SHELBY COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

CA held that Elmore's plea agreement in Shelby Circuit Court should be construed to require the trial court to enter the exact order of probation as that which was entered in the Jefferson Circuit Court.  Shelby Circuit Court’s later inclusion of an additional condition of confinement to home under Adult Supervision 24 hours a day – 7 days a week in its order of probation was erroneous.  Upon remand, Elmore shall be entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement at his re-sentencing or to the withdrawal of his original guilty plea pursuant to RCr 8.10.  If he elects specific performance, the court shall re-sentence Elmore according to the terms of the plea agreement as resolved in this opinion.

Kentucky has no clear rule as to which party should benefit from an ambiguity where a plea agreement is involved. However, our courts have long adhered to the rule contra proferentem in construing contracts; i.e., “when a contract is susceptible of two meanings, it will be construed strongest against the party who drafted and prepared it.”  The overwhelming sentiment among Kentucky's sister states is that any ambiguity in such an agreement should be resolved in favor of the defendant and against the government.

Digested by Scott C. Byrd

Maintenance Pendent Lite and permanent: CLARK V. CLARK (COA 9/21/2007)

CLARK V. CLARK
FAMILY LAW:  MAINTENANCE

2005-CA-002502
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
PANEL: ACREE PRESIDING;  KELLER, LAMBERT CONCUR
JEFFERSON COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

Ex-Wife appealed from TC’s Order assigning value to a 2002 Ford Taurus, not valuing or dividing certain certificates of deposit (CD’s) and reducing her maintenance. Parties separated after eighteen years of marriage. At the time of their divorce, Ex-Wife was 70 years old and Ex-Husband was 78. Prior to their marriage, Ex-Husband owned a home, land and livestock. Ex-Husband sold his livestock shortly after the marriage and purchased CD’s with the proceeds. During their marriage, the parties lived on Ex-Husband's social security and pension benefits and, once Ex-Wife reached 62, her social security benefits.

While Ex-Wife's dissolution petition was pending, Ex-Husband was ordered to pay $300.00 per month pendente lite maintenance. After trial, TC found the Taurus to be marital property and awarded it to Ex-Wife with a value of $12,000.00. The CD’s were neither assigned nor awarded since Ex-Wife failed to present any evidence that they existed at the time of the parties' divorce. After dividing all marital property, TC reduced Ex-Wife's maintenance award to a monthly sum of $100.00. Ex-Wife filed this appeal. Subsequently, Ex-Wife filed a CR 60.02 Motion for TC to consider new evidence reflecting that Ex-Husband had cashed out CD’s prior to dissolution but after separation. TC denied this motion. CA indicated that any appeal of that Motion must be separate from this appeal.

Ex-Wife first argued that TC abused its discretion when it assumed facts not in evidence about the value of the 2002 Ford Taurus, and further argued that Ex-Husband had purchased the car as a gift for her and, thus, it was not marital property within the definition of Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.190(2). At trial, Ex-Husband disputed that the Taurus was purchased as a gift to Ex-Wife. At trial, neither party testified as to the current value of the Taurus. TC found that Ex-Wife failed to meet her burden of proving that the car was her nonmarital property. The car was awarded to Ex-Wife and assigned the $12,000.00 value listed as its NADA book value in Ex-Husband's mandatory case disclosure. Ex-Wife contended it was incumbent upon Ex-Husband to introduce evidence of the car's value at trial, since he argued it was a marital asset, citing CR 43.01(1), which states, “The party holding the affirmative of an issue must produce the evidence to prove it.” Ex-Wife claimed Ex-Husband’s failure to introduce evidence of its value at trial deprived her of the opportunity to refute his figure. Thus, she argued the burden of refuting the Taurus' supposed value of $12,000.00 never fell to her. She asked CA to assign a value of zero dollars to the car or, in the alternative, to allow her to present evidence contradicting the value assigned by TC. CA disagreed with Ex-Wife’s contentions. CA noted that Ex-Wife had filed her own MCD but failed to assign any value to the Taurus because she contended it was her nonmarital property. Ex-Wife had notice that Ex-Husband was characterizing the car as marital property and also of its asserted value. CA opined that, instead of introducing her own evidence regarding the car's value, Ex-Wife relied on her ability to persuade TC of the car's nonmarital character. CA found no error in TC’s decision on this issue.

Ex-Wife next argues that TC’s division should have recognized and divided the CD’s between the parties. At trial, Ex-Wife introduced records showing existence of CD’s in 2001. She did not testify to the source of the funds, and offered no proof that the CD’s still existed. Ex-Husband testified that all of the funds used to purchase the CD’s came from the sale of his nonmarital livestock and that the CD’s were exhausted during the marriage. TC found that it was unable to award or assign an asset whose existence was unproven. Ex-Wife asked CA to consider evidence she presented in support of her CR 60.02 motion that Ex-Husband had cashed out the CD’s shortly after the parties separated. However, CA noted that it had issued a previous order that issues related to the CR 60.02 Motion must be contained to a timely appeal of that Motion, and Ex-Wife failed to timely appeal that Motion. CA found no error in TC’s order on this issue.

Finally, Ex-Wife argued TC abused its discretion when it reduced her maintenance award, as it set her permanent maintenance so low that she would be dependent upon others for the means to meet her basic needs. At trial, Ex-Wife told TC that she was currently obliged to live with her daughter, and, as a result, TC subtracted her rent and telephone bills from her monthly living expenses. CA held that a TC’s failure to award a sum sufficient to allow a spouse to meet her needs without requiring that she depend on the generosity of family and friends was plainly an abuse of discretion. CA held that TC clearly erred, as its Order did not address the issue of Ex-Wife's current standard of living versus the lifestyle she shared with Ex-Husband during their marriage. TC’s order affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to TC to review maintenance award.

As digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates.

Maintenance and Child Support: BAILEY V. BAILEY (COA 9/21/2007)

BAILEY V. BAILEY
FAMILY LAW: CHILD SUPPORT (MAJORITY, DISABILITY); MAINTENANCE VS. CHILD SUPPORT
2006-CA-001188
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
PANEL: HOWARD PRESIDING; MOORE, GUIDUGLI CONCUR
BATH COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

Dad appealed TC’s judgment awarding Mom maintenance and child support. Dad contended that TC abused its discretion in considering their child's future college expenses in determining the duration of the maintenance award.

During marriage, Dad was an emergency care physician and Mom was a nurse. Their son was 5 and they had been married 3 years when they separated. After trial, TC found that the parties’ combined income exceeded the child support guidelines and awarded Mom monthly child support of $2,072.34. TC also awarded Mom $2,000 monthly maintenance and established the duration of that award at twelve years, based upon Son’s age at that time of ten. Mom had asked for eight years of maintenance, to assist her until Son graduated from high school at age eighteen. TC awarded twelve years’ maintenance, so as to provide maintenance to Mom until Son graduated from high school, as well as four additional years beyond his graduation, so long as Son attended college full time with Mom's assistance.

CA held that Dad has no legal duty to support Son after he is of age and that TC may not use the amount or duration of a maintenance award to indirectly award child support if the amount could not be directly awarded as child support. As the final four years of Mom’s maintenance award were expressly based on the impact on Mom of providing for Son's college education, thereby indirectly compelling Dad to provide for Son's college costs, TC abused its discretion in awarding the final four years of maintenance to Mom. Mom contended to CA that the duration of the maintenance award was necessary for her to maintain her standard of living. Because TC expressly stated that the monthly amount of its award was based on Mom's standard of living, and that Son's anticipated college expenses were the basis for the duration of the award, specifically for the last four years, CA disagreed. CA vacated the last four years of the maintenance award, affirmed remainder of order, and remanded to TC for entry of order consistent with CA opinion.

As digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates.

Termination of Parental Rights: B.(M.) V. W. (D.) (COA 9/21/2007)

B.(M.)  V. W. (D.)
FAMILY LAW: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

2006-CA-002285
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: HOWARD PRESIDING; ACREE, LAMBERT CONCUR
HARDIN COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

TC granted a petition for adoption, which thereby terminated Father’s parental rights. The TC held, pursuant to statutory authority, that termination was appropriate because the child had suffered neglect and emotional harm. TC reasoned that the harm resulted from father’s failure to appropriately prepare the child, mentally, for the effects of his gender reassignment surgery. Due to the harm inflicted on the child it was in her best interest to grant the petition for adoption. Additionally, the TC held that Father had failed to financially support the child because he had not been paying his share of her insurance and medical expenses.

CA held, TC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the courts decision to terminate parental rights and grant the adoption was not clearly erroneous. CA also opined that Father failed to preserve his argument that less drastic measures should have been taken. Regardless, CA reasoned that TC had made an implied finding that there were no less drastic measures. Finally, CA stated that it was not holding that gender reassignment is itself grounds for termination of parental rights. Instead, the CA stated that it was upholding TC’s decision because all of the statutory elements were meet and supported by substantial evidence.

As digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates.

Professions (therapist licensing): COMMONWEALTH V. DUBIN (COA 921/2007)

COMMONWEALTH V. DUBIN
GOVERNMENT: REGULATORY LAW - PROFESSIONS, LICENSING OF THERAPISTS

2006-CA-001173
PUBLISHED: REVERSING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
PANEL: TAYLOR PRESIDING; MOORE CONCURS; DIXON CONCURS WITH RESULT ONLY
FRANKLIN COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 09/21/2007

KY State Board of Physical Therapy (BPT) appeals TC's ruling in favor of Dubin Ortho Centre on the issue of whether Dubin's practice of using 2 specific billing codes (CPT Codes 97001 and 97002) reserved for physical therapy treatment violated KRS 327.020 since the treatment was rendered by a doctor rather than a licensed physical therapist. Dubin successfully argued to the TC that KRS 311.550(10) defining the scope of the practice of medicine controlled in this case, and encompassed physical therapy services. BPT conversely argues on appeal that the clear wording of the more specific, and therefore controlling, statute governing physical therapy treatment required a licensed physical therapist before the 2 billing codes could be legally used.

The COA examined the legislative intent behind both statutes in an effort to reach a reasonable interpretation that gives the most effect to both statutes. The COA concluded that while a physician may render the same or similar treatment as a physical therapist, he/she may not refer to the treatment as physical therapy or bill it as physical therapy services using the 2 codes at issue. The COA therefore reversed the TC's decision and directed it to grant BPT injunctive relief against Dubin to restrain the use of the subject billing codes since the case evidence revealed the PT services patients received at Dubin were rendered by an athletic trainer who was not licensed as a physical therapist pursuant to KRS 327.020.

By Chad Kessinger
Schiller Osbourn Barnes & Maloney

Real Estate Assignments: WATTS V. SIMPSON (COA, Modified 9/21/2007)

WATTS V. SIMPSON
PROPERTY: REAL ESTATE, ASSIGNMENT, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
2006-CA-001243
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
DATE RENDERED:  08/03/2007;  MODIFIED: 09/21/2007